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The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic has adversely affected the fortunes of multiple 
companies around the globe. Accordingly, questions are increasingly being asked about how 
organizations can revitalize during and after a crisis. Yet, we have limited understanding of how 
organizations renew themselves during crises over time. We explore this question through the lens 
and examination of two South-Asian airlines: Pakistan International Airlines and Sri Lankan 
Airlines. The cases offer important insights into the reasons behind underperformance of state-
controlled enterprises and renewal activities. We shed light on strategic renewal (SR) in the wake 
of increasing liberalization and deregulations in the global airline industry. To this end, we propose 
a four-stage approach towards renewing such underperforming organizations to respond effectively 
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1  INTRODUCTION  
Accompanying the COVID-19 pandemic are over 72 million coronavirus cases and over 
1,615,191deaths, and counting, across the globe (Worldometers, 2020; World Health Organization, 
2020). The pandemic has triggered a wave of bankruptcies of small and large businesses not only 
in advanced economies such as the US and UK, but also across the developing world (Amankwah-
Amoah, Khan & Wood, 2020; Mathurin, Aliaj & Fontanella-Khan, 2020). Indeed, in the US a 
record number of large companies have filed for Chapter 11 notwithstanding trillions in government 
support surpassing the 2009 levels during the global financial crisis (Mathurin et al., 2020). The 
prolonged impact of COVID-19 is exemplified by the weakening position of businesses and high 
risk of business failure with attendant long-term social and economic challenges. The COVID-19 
pandemic has altered the industry landscape (Sheng et al., 2020) and reshaped consumer buying 
behavior (Mathurin et al., 2020) extensively. The situation urgently calls for strategic renewal (SR) 
to improve organizational resilience and survival. Yet, we lack insights into how history can inform 
our understanding of how organizations renew during times of extreme crisis coupled with multiple 
external influences and shocks. In an increasingly interconnected world typified by surging global 
competition and a rise of digitalization (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2012, 2017), survival has become 
a struggle for underperforming companies. 
The COVID-19 pandemic and the effects on the existence and survival of multiple companies 
around the globe is raising questions as to how organizations can revitalize during and after a crisis. 
Interestingly, the unexpected COVID-19 pandemic led to the collapse of airlines in the immediate 
aftermath (Amankwah-Amoah, 2020b; Rosalsky, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic has so far led 
to the collapse of multiple businesses in all corners of the globe including government-backed and 
privately owned businesses (Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2020). Although there are calls from the 
popular press and scholars for firms to be renewed, relatively limited sustainable reforms can be 




affect some industries more than others. The pandemic has had a devastating and potentially long-
lasting effect on the airline industry, far more than other industries.  
The objective of the paper is to examine how organizations renew themselves during crises 
over time. In this paper, we offer lessons from history on how some organizations have managed 
to revitalize themselves in spite of such unexpected constraints in the business environment. We 
utilize the cases of two contrasting South Asian airlines: Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) and 
Sri Lankan Airlines (SLA)—ailing state-owned airlines—to illustrate our analysis. Bloomberg 
(2016) dubbed PIA as the “world’s most overstaffed airline” and the “world’s least-productive 
national carrier”. This was exemplified by the fact that the airline’s 15,000 full-time employees 
generate around 61,000 rupees each year ($585), the lowest of the 72 listed airlines, thereby making 
it the world’s most overstaffed firm (Bloomberg, 2016; see also Chong, 2016). It is worth noting 
that in 2006, the government had a 92% stake in the airline with the employees controlling around 
3.9% (Bloomberg, 2016). From 2010 to 2015, the losses of the airline more than tripled to 27.8 
billion rupees (Bloomberg, 2016). At the time of writing, the airline’s future remained uncertain 
with both the government and the trade union struggling to shape its strategic direction. Our 
contention is not that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) should disappear from the global industry, 
but rather we concur with those who view them as a suitable case for special treatment (e.g., Zhou, 
Gao, & Zhao, 2016).  
The article contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, we contribute to the 
contemporary management discourse on the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on business 
activities (Khan et al., 2020; Sheng et al., 2020) by shedding light on two international 
organizations: Pakistan International Airlines and Sri Lankan Airlines, weathering the crisis and 
attempting to renew themselves. Second, building on existing literature on SR (e.g., Agarwal & 
Helfat, 2009; Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Riviere & Suder, 2016; Volberda et al., 2001), the article 




extreme shocks and black swan events. Lastly, although research on SR has surged over the last 
decade (cf. Agarwal & Helfat, 2009; Schmitt, Barker III, and Raisch, 2016), limited attention has 
been paid to organizations, particularly SOEs, operating in emerging or developing economies—
the case in point is Pakistan and Sri Lanka. We contribute to the literature by responding to recent 
calls to integrate “history into international business” and organization studies research (Buckley, 
2020, p. 1) by offering important insights from PIA and SLA, which are from two of the least 
studied countries by international business management scholars.  
In the remainder of this article, we first provide a background on the historical evolutions 
of PIA and SLA. We then outline an integrated range of factors that have stifled SR efforts. We 
then summarize the problems of the airlines and outline a four-step approach towards renewal of 
such organizations. 
2  STRATEGIC RENEWAL AND CAPABILITIES AFTER CRISIS  
Our theoretical underpinning revolves around two streams of literature: SR and dynamic 
capabilities (DCs). Broadly speaking, SR refers to the activities undertaken by a firm to achieve 
success or change its path dependence, which ultimately prolong its existence (Lewin & Volberda, 
1999; Riviere, Suder, & Bass, 2018). SR activities often commence after experiencing turbulence 
in the business environment (cf. Crossan & Berdrow, 2003; Eggers & Kaplan, 2009). Increasing 
global competition now means that private or state-owned companies must renew themselves to 
remain competitive (Amankwah-Amoah et al., 2017; Osei et al., 2019). Such renewal has been 
accelerated by the rise of digitalization, which in turn enables firms to improve processes via 
capture of widely available intangible knowledge assets. SR refers to the utilization of an 
organization’s underlying resources and expertise to respond to emerging challenges in the business 
environment. Prior research has indicated that a firm’s SR activities are driven by a number of 




Volberda, Baden-Fuller, & Van den Bosch, 2001). The internal forces include financial 
mismanagement, depletion of resources, and lack of skilled employees.  
The external factors include changing consumer behavior, new sources of competition, and changes 
in government industrial policy. Thus, SR encompasses managerial initiatives taken to ensure that 
the firm’s resources and expertise are marshalled to respond to the external forces (Knott & Posen, 
2009; Kim & Pennings, 2009). As Volberda et al. (2001a, p. 162) observed, “The ideal emergent 
journey of renewal is rooted in the assumption that managers believe that they should be essentially 
outwardly oriented or passive; their role being to amplify market forces and market signals”. 
Renewal entails developing new sets of capabilities to innovate and transform an organization. 
 By DCs, we are referring to those capabilities through which organizational leaders and 
managers “integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly 
changing environments” (Teece et al., 1997, p. 516). Through DCs, firms can sense, seize 
opportunities, and reconfigure resources and capabilities for the development of competitive 
advantage (Teece, 2007, 2014). Helfat et al. (2007) suggest that DCs are search, selection, and 
deployment capabilities through which firms can outperform their rivals. DCs are the higher-order 
capabilities compared to operating capabilities that are needed for the performance of routine tasks 
(e.g., Helfat & Peteraf, 2009; Helfat & Winter, 2011). Firms’ ability to reconfigure their resources 
and capabilities continuously to address environmental threats is at the cornerstone of DCs (Teece 
et al., 1997). A pivotal feature is firms’ ability to take advantage of existing limited resources and 
expertise to innovate (Rumelt, 1987). Past studies have demonstrated that human resource practices 
are unlikely to lead to sustainable competitive advantage given that they can be copied by rivals. It 
is, rather, the mobilization and integration of the knowledge, skills, and expertise of employees to 
design and implement policies to respond to or neutralize external threats that are responsible for 




Past studies have suggested that CEOs’ perceptions and interpretations can lead to situations 
where firms in the same industry adopt entirely different renewal journeys and activities (Al 
Humaidan & Sabatier, 2017; Schmitt et al., 2016). To improve performance or reverse decline, SR 
may lead to the termination of or formation of new strategic alliances (Amankwah-Amoah et al., 
2017). Alliance as a component of SR is often geared towards accessing new resources and 
networks to improve a firm’s competitiveness. Based on these arguments, it is suggested that firms 
would chart different paths to SR. Thus, it entails an evolutionary process (Floyd & Lane, 2000), 
and also path dependent (Volberda et al., 2001).   
Activities in government-backed organizations, particularly in the context of emerging and 
developing economies, are relatively underexplored. Most of the existing research has examined 
SOEs mainly in the context of China (e.g., Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010; Peng et al., 2016). In China, 
the economic environment is quite stable compared to Pakistan and Sri Lanka which have faced 
incidents of terrorism with related government inefficiencies that inhibit renewal of SOEs. In this 
context, it is vital to understand the SR of firms operating in highly unstable environments. 
Although corporate failures and organizational declines are possible outcomes of an increasingly 
digitalized global economy (Amankwah-Amoah, 2016a), few studies have sought to examine 
underperforming companies against the backdrop of external crises. Thus, this study fills this void 
in the literature. 
3  METHOD AND DATA COLLECTION 
Following Yin (2008), we utilized multiple sources of evidence to demonstrate how SR has 
unfolded in the two organizations (PIA and SLA). Such case studies are particularly useful when 
seeking to develop an in-depth understanding of an issue (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2012). 
We relied mainly on the archival research method (Kotabe & Kothari, 2016; Welch, 2000; 
Ventresca & Mohr, 2002), which is effective when exploring such issues (Gill, Gill & Roulet, 2018) 




records spanning several decades. Archival records refer to “documents made or received and 
accumulated by a person or organization in the course of the conduct of its affairs and preserved 
because of their continuing value” (Ellis, 1993, p. 2). Accordingly, we utilized secondary data such 
as news articles, company annual reports, and respective government reports on the two airlines.  
In all, we obtained hundreds of articles and reports on both airlines alongside industry reports and 
magazines including “Flight International” and “Airline Business”, and business 
magazines/newspapers such as “The Economist” and “Financial Times”. Whilst some of the data 
were publicly available, personal contacts and experiences of one of the authors with respect to the 
airline industry was valuable in gaining access to information from relevant stakeholders. One set 
of the research team examined the case of PIA and the other focused on SLA. Both teams developed 
the chronology of activities of PIA and SLA separately and then met to explore the linkages and 
differences in the cases. The two separate case study accounts were synthesized and integrated into 
one piece. The emerging narrative also identifies the similarities and differences between the two 
cases. By using multiple sources, we were able to deduce a clear narrative of how the activities and 
strategies of the airlines have manifested with the passage of time. 
4  THE GLOBAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
Historically, liberalization and globalization have transformed the competitive landscape of 
the global airline industry (Belobaba, Odoni, & Barnhart, 2009; Button, 2001), including many 
other industries (Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen, Musacchio, & Ramaswamy, 2014). Specifically, the 
Airline Deregulation Act 1978 in the US under President Carter, the establishment of the European 
Common Aviation Market, and the adoption of marker liberal policies ushered in the waves of 
privatization of state-owned airlines (SOAs) in the 1980s (Doganis, 2006; Chang & Williams, 
2001). The Airline Deregulation Act, in many ways, served as a springboard in encouraging many 
developed and developing nations to embrace the notion, having been unenthusiastic about 




carriers were state owned with notable exceptions in the US and some parts of Latin America 
(Doganis, 2006).  
Although many countries saw privatization as an opportunity to offload loss-making airlines 
to reduce national budget deficits (Ramamurti & Sarathy, 1997), many countries in the developing 
world in Asia and Africa failed to seize the opportunity to reform their national airlines. 
Accordingly, the waves of privatization were limited to mainly liberal or advanced economies at 
the time. For more than 30 years, one of the strongest justifications against privatization to inject 
commercial objectives into such national airlines was that exposure to market competition would 
lead to loss of market share to foreign rivals and even eventual collapse (see also Ramamurti & 
Sarathy, 1997). As such, many SOAs that underperformed compared to their privately owned rivals 
managed to maintain their existence. 
According to the International Air Transport Association (2020), as a result of the COVID-
19 pandemic 2020 traffic is expected to decline by about 66% compared to 2019 figures. This has 
weakened the financial position of many global airlines, thereby pushing many toward bankruptcy, 
For the industry, the effects of the pandemic and constraints on their operations manifested in the 
forms of border closures, government-mandated travel restrictions, planes grounded due to lack of 
demand, and quarantine measures for international travelers (Amankwah-Amoah, 2020a). These 
constraints have led to job losses by pilots, inflight personnel, etc. The effects of the pandemic on 
the airline industry appears to be excessive relative to the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. 
With lingering uncertainties and the changing restrictions of state governments across the globe, 
airlines are unable to design and charter definitive processes to renew and revive their operations 
across national borders. Global airlines are increasingly recognizing that successfully emerging out 
of the crisis and pandemics such as Ebola (Amankwah‐Amoah, 2016b) and COVID-19 is partly 




cases—PIA and SLA—offer some pathways into how organizations can renew for the future 
against the backdrop of persistent internal and external challenges. 
4.1 Case 1: The evolution of PIA 
PIA is an incumbent airline founded in 1946 (as Orient Airways, which was originally based 
in Calcutta before the partition of British India). In 1955 it was nationalized and renamed PIA, 
spearheading the push for global expansion after national/government reconfiguration. Since then, 
the airline has undergone various stages in its development. As the national flag carrier, PIA has 
been able to enjoy the patronage of locals and domestic politicians. It has also become the airline 
of choice by patriotic Pakistanis who viewed it as a source of national pride. Besides developing 
extensive domestic-route networks from its major hub in Karachi and minor hubs in Islamabad and 
Lahore, PIA has also developed route networks from Islamabad and Lahore to London and other 
Western and Eastern destinations (Chong, 2016). However, in recent years, it has lost many 
customers to rivals. Several new initiatives were undertaken under the former chief executive, 
Bernd Hildenbrand, involving the expansion to new destinations in Asia and new promising 
markets to recover lost market share (Chong, 2016). This also included the launch of a premier 
service (six flights per week) from Islamabad and Lahore to London. Currently, the airline enjoys 
a market share of around 24% in the international passenger markets and 47% in the domestic 
market (Business Recorder, 2016).  
 PIA contributed to the formation of other airlines; indeed, Emirates started in 1985 with 
two leased aircraft from PIA. Over the years, it has also faced resistance to reform and privatization 
from multiple quarters including the employees, powerful unions, and national governments even 
in the face of losses and declining performance. Indeed, in 1997 the proposed privatization of the 
airline was dropped in the face of resistance from trade unions, but the airline renewed its aircraft 
fleet to help improve efficiency and reduce the repair costs. In announcing the decision, the then 




(O’Toole, 1997, p. nd). At the time, some of the problems identified were low efficiency and poor-
quality service (O’Toole, 1997). Although Pakistan had previously explored the possibility of 
privatizing and restructuring the airline, including consulting with International Finance – the 
consulting branch of the World Bank (Flightglobal, 1997a) – these attempts have failed to yield 
any fruitful outcomes.  
Besides the benefits stemming from being regarded as the national airline, the operations 
are also intricately linked with national security and political interests of various political parties. 
This has also often become a source of resistance to privatization and reform. After PIA’s first 
public share offering in 1990, it took until 2004 for the second share offering to occur when the 
country’s Privatization Commission offered 5% of shares for sale to domestic and overseas 
Pakistani investors (Flightglobal, 2004). These were attempts to promote a move towards 
increasing private involvement in the airline and improving its profitability. PIA is competing on 
two fronts: not only against low-cost rivals on domestic and regional routes but also against other 
better equipped legacy airlines from developed countries, including British Airways. In recent 
years, regional and global carriers have captured market share from PIA on international routes. 
The airline is also facing stiff competition from several domestic airlines such as Airblue, Shaheen 
Air, Air Indus, and Star Air Aviation, thus putting further pressure on its domestic market share. 
For much of its long life, PIA was able to capture a large segment of passenger traffic to the yearly 
Islamic Haj to Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia (Moffett, 2001).  
However, in recent years many carriers and Middle East airlines such as Emirates and 
Etihad have emerged in these traditionally strong markets, further exerting pressure on PIA’s 
operations and revenue streams. In 2013, the controlling stake of the government was around 86.7% 
with 57.7% via direct holding and the remaining 29% through financial institutions, leaving the rest 
to small investors (Airfinance Journal, 2013). Another factor which has hampered the long-term 




ground operations, food, cargo management, and maintenance services, while most of the high-
performing global airlines have outsourced these services to specialists in order to focus on core 
services.  
4.1.1 Aging fleet 
In 2006, PIA’s revenues surged above 10% and passenger traffic by 12%, however, this was 
offset by the record increase in fuel prices and a 71% rise in financial costs to finance fleet 
replacement (Ionides, 2007). In 2007, the airline faced a different challenge. This time it was more 
intertwined with the ban on some of its fleet. In 2007, PIA was partially banned from operating 
some of its aircraft to European destinations due to safety concerns (Ionides, 2007). The European 
Union ban which limited its aircraft to only Boeing 777s was subsequently lifted but the suspended 
services and safety concerns damaged the reputation of the airline (Ionides, 2007). The notion that 
airlines originating from the third world contribute disproportionately to global airline accidents is 
not new to industry observers (Flightglobal, 1997b). Nonetheless, such bans often hamper such 
airlines’ ability to attract passengers on routes where they face fierce competition from those 
originating from advanced economies. Although PIA was not the only airline banned by the 
European Union around the time, including many operating from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, 
the suspended services affected its image and ability to attract new customers. One of its SR efforts 
was its $1.2 billion fleet renewal which encompassed 21 of its 47 aircraft (Airfinance Journal, 
2013).  
4.1.2 Flight cancellations 
Over the last decade, the airline has sought to bring new partners on board. In 2011, the 
airline lost around two billion Pakistani rupees ($23.6 million) on its passenger and cargo operations 
due to flight cancellations following a four-day strike by its 18,000 employees which forced the 




agreement with Turkish Airlines which was viewed by the employees as potentially leading to the 
loss of some lucrative routes and consequently their jobs (Yeo, 2011b). Such underperformance, 
delays, cancellations, and losses have dented its reputation and ability to attract locals. By late 2011, 
the airline had accumulated losses of around 120 billion rupees (Rs) ($1.34 billion) over a 10-year 
period, stemming from landing and infrastructural charges, rising fuel costs, and depreciation of 
the rupee against major world currencies including the US dollar (Hashim, 2011). In 2011, the 
airline sought to replace its aging fleet of Boeing 747s and Airbus A310s with A320s or 737-
800/900s and 777-300/-300ERs (Hashim, 2011). Besides viewing fleet renewal as part of the 
solution to repairing its balance sheet, it represented part of PIA’s strategy to increase its fleet to 
around 80 by 2020 (Hashim, 2011; Yeo, 2011a). Following a prolonged period of 
underperformance in 2012, PIA’s liabilities exceeded assets to the tune of 123 billion rupees ($1.3 
billion) (Rivers, 2012). The accumulating losses prompted independent auditors to issue a warning 
about the status of the national carrier (Rivers, 2012). 
4.1.3 Protection from market competition  
For many SOAs, much of their success in the past was underpinned by the system of 
bilateral air services agreements stemming from the Chicago Convention on International Civil 
Aviation in 1944, which required nations to designate airlines regardless of their traffic potential 
(Belobaba et al., 2009; Doganis, 2006). By designating airlines for international markets, 
governments were able to preserve key and profitable routes for their national carriers. The limited 
competition also meant that fare rises became a prominent strategy to respond to major crises 
including rising oil prices and losses. Nonetheless, deregulation and liberalization gathered 
momentum across the globe following the Airline Deregulation Act 1978 in the US and the 
establishment of the European Common Aviation Market. This trend was accompanied by the shift 
from single to multiple designations in most international bilateral arrangements since the 1970s 




developments ushered in a new and more competitive environment for national airlines. Arguably, 
state ownership and accompanying protection appeared to have dissuaded national airlines from 
striving for efficiency. In recent years, globalization pressures and market competition have made 
it costly and inefficient for governments to protect underperforming SOAs (Amankwah-Amoah, 
2015; Clougherty, 2001). It is long established that SOEs are generally “highly inefficient”, 
characterized by “jobs for the boys”, and often struggle to make a profit (Shleifer & Vishney, 1994). 
Such state airlines often appear to promote political “empire building” at the expense of efficiency 
and expediency, consequently contributing to declining performance. 
4.1.4 Conflicting stakeholder interests 
Conflicting stakeholder interests, which are manifest in the way interest groups compete for 
territory and influence, are common in state-owned organizations. For most organizations, the 
desire to achieve profitability often means making difficult decisions about eliminating overlapping 
activities which ultimately lead to job losses . However, government-owned businesses often resist 
when confronted with potential job losses, which would inevitably lead to increased 
unemployment. In the wake of frequent flight delays, long-standing political interference, over-
staffing, and continued losses, PIA has leant precariously towards closure for years due to failure 
to reform (Masood, 2014, p. A6). Thus, in 2013 “Airfinance Journal” (2013, p. 3) postulated 
whether the airline could be disentangled from the “outrageous bureaucratic interference in its 
operations” given the conflicting interest of the government and other powerful stakeholders. 
Stemming from such indecisions is the desire to persist with the status quo which makes 
profitability difficult to achieve.  
As Ramamurti and Sarathy (1997, p. 398) note, when airlines have been state controlled, 
“governments have found it politically inconvenient to discipline their managers and workers, 
preferring instead to postpone painful adjustments such as privatization, which workers, suppliers 




interference and injection of public funds also usher in a culture of appointments based on politics 
rather than economics. As state influences permeate the activities of SOEs, profitability and 
superior performance become difficult to achieve, more so in a liberalized setting (Shleifer, 1998; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). One source of the airline’s problems can be attributed to the culture of 
“sifarish” which is an Urdu word which refers to recommendation or connection which underpins 
the family- and kinship-based social structures similar to Guanxi in China (Islam, 2004, p. 322). It 
has been suggested that this is the “standard means of getting things done by public functionaries” 
(Islam, 2004, p. 322). As Islam (2004, p. 323) observed, PIA often apportions a number of seats to 
government ministries and departments on every flight, which are kept close to departure. This also 
reflects the invisible hand of government officials in the management and allocation of the airline’s 
scarce resources.  
One of the earliest challenges revolved around how PIA could fulfil its social goal of being 
the national flag carrier whilst concurrently maintaining viable commercial operations. Another 
factor has been the subsidies or free services provided to politicians and their families. Indeed, the 
state-owned and controlled airlines often “delay flights to accommodate tardy politicians and senior 
bureaucrats” and in so doing create conditions for further delay and underperformance (Masood, 
2014: A6). By providing state financial injection to help such airlines maintain their operations, it 
decouples firm performance from its ability to survive. Therefore, managers then begin to focus 
more on winning and maintaining the support of the state, thereby creating conditions for 
underperformance. In a similar vein, this story appears familiar given that multiple SOAs around 
the globe such as Ghana Airways, Nigeria Airways and Air Afrique all toyed with the idea of 
privatization and then failed to follow it through. These national airlines eventually suffered the 
ultimate fate of collapse, besieged with problems such as overstaffing, pursuit of political goals 





4.1.5 Employee quota  
Another set of factors pertains to the desire of the government to have a diverse workforce, 
which represents the make-up of the population. Historically, a system of regional quotas has 
permeated the human resource management of civil service organizations such as PIA Corporation 
(PIAC) and Pakistan Steel (Jhatial, Cornelius, & Wallace, 2014). This has often led to ethnic group 
dominance in the employment of PIAC. Jhatial et al. (2014) observed that around 43% of its 
employees originated from Punjab, 27% from Urban Sindh, and 11% from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 
An unintended outcome has been that the quota system has failed to reflect the level of expertise 
required to manage efficient operations of the airline. It also means that hiring decisions could be 
driven by factors other than an individual’s expertise, knowledge and ability. Accordingly, 
recruitment is based on political considerations rather than competence and expertise. 
Mismanagement has often been the outcome of such a quota system. The conflicting interest group 
has long delayed privatization efforts. Furthermore, the PIA unions were frequently patronized by 
major political parties who brought in the culture of inefficiency and underperformance. 
4.1.6 Misallocation of resources 
One source of drain on the firm’s finances was the annual budget of around 2.42 billion 
rupees (estimated $70 million) to bring the aging fleet up to date – some of which date as far back 
as 1959 (Airfinance Journal, 2013). This is surprising compared with the fact that in 2010 the 
average age of aircraft of the seven major US airlines, including Alaska, American, Continental, 
Southwest, and United, was about 14 years. Given the high safety standards of inspection, 
maintenance, and replacement of parts in the industry, some fleets can stay safe for 25 to 30 years 
(Pawlowski, 2010; The Airline Monitor, 2010). Even with that, older aircraft entail higher repair 
and replacement costs. In addition, as far back as 2001, Moffett (2001) observed that servicing and 
replacing parts of its aging fleet was leading to losses. This was also intertwined with poor customer 




this point, fleet modernization was viewed as a priority in revitalizing the airline and providing 
improved services to customers (Moffett, 2001).  
Although the desire to privatize has been on the back burner for decades, the turn of the 21st 
century unveiled much of the deep-seated problems around overstaffing and political interference. 
This overwhelming political influence was exemplified by the observation that the airline’s 12-man 
board of directors was bloated with “government functionaries” (Airfinance Journal, 2013, p. 3). 
Consequently, the ability of new executives to shape or change the direction of the airline is often 
curtailed by these powerful influences. One of the problems faced by the airline, like many in the 
emerging world, has been that many of the individuals trained are poached by other Asian and 
wealthy Gulf airlines (Flightglobal, 2011). This has not only drained PIA’s resources but also 
hampered its growth prospects whilst, concurrently, strengthening its rivals in the same region. To 
the outside observer, this suggests that the airline has often borne the cost of training workers but 
benefited little from their investment. Recently, the PIA has been facing further problems related 
to the dubious pilot licensing issues and the suspension of its operation from some global markets, 
including the EU. These and the above-mentioned issues thus require SR in order to respond to 
internal and external challenges. In addition, the widespread disruptions caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic are putting severe pressure on PIA’s resources. It is in this context that Bloomberg (2020) 
noted that the PIA, along with 10 other airlines, almost went bust due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Also, recently the PIA has announced a $78 million voluntary separation scheme to its 3,200 staff 
in order to reduce excessive workforce and cut costs (Express Tribune, 2020a, 2020b). The PIA has 
so far suffered a Rs31.9 billion (around $200 million) loss during the current year due to the ongoing 
pandemic (Express Tribune, 2020a, 2020b). These figures indicate that PIA is under massive 




4.2 Case 2: Sri Lankan Airlines 
SLA is the flag carrier and the largest airline in Sri Lanka. It is the successor of Air Ceylon 
which was established in 1947 as the state-owned flag carrier. At the inception, Australian National 
Airways (ANA) provided the initial technical assistance to operate the aircraft and subsequently 
ANA acquired a 49% stake in Air Ceylon. In 1953, Air Ceylon stopped international flights due to 
stiff competition. In 1953 Dutch carrier KLM acquired the 49% stake held by ANA, and 
subsequently Air Ceylon resumed international flights in 1956. In 1961 Air Ceylon stopped 
international flights again due to competition, and later on resumed international flights in 1969. In 
1979 the government terminated the operations of Air Ceylon. and replaced it with Air Lanka as 
the new national carrier. The termination culminated in the formation in 1979 of new Sri Lanka’s 
national carrier- Air Lanka (Begum, 2020). Air Lanka then experienced several ups and downs over 
the subsequent decades. Besides becoming an award-winning airline with a very good reputation 
for service quality and safety, it also had a well-developed network connecting to multiple 
destinations. 
 In January 1999, Flight International Magazine reported the government’s attempt to thwart 
the formation of potential start-up PeaceAir by noting the decision of the government not to grant 
international rights to any other airline except Air Lanka for around a decade (Flight International, 
1999). This was geared towards protecting the airline from intense market competition. By seeking 
to shield the airline from market competition, there was little incentive for it to improve the quality 
of services and inflight services to attract new customers. 
SLA was formerly known as Air Lanka until it was privatized in 1998. The privatization 
culminated in the government offloading 43.63% stake (worth $70 million) to the Emirates Group 
(Emirates, a Dubai-based carrier) in tandem with strategic partnership with Emirates securing a 10-
year management agreement (Ionides, 2002). The benefits offered by Emirate Airlines’ expertise 




“investments and management matters” and wanted to enhance the brand and legitimacy of the 
airline (Begum, 2020, p. nd). The injection of Emirates-appointed managers in the strategic and 
operational decisions of the airline led to changes such as the overhauling the route network and 
fleets, and the corporate image (Ionides, 2002). Accordingly, AirLanka was rebranded as SriLankan 
Airlines.  
Nevertheless, the productivity gains were eroded by the global industry downturn in 2001 
in tandem with the 2001 attack by Tamil separatists Colombo airport, which disrupted its operations 
and destroyed four of its aircrafts (Ionides, 2002, p. nd; BBC, 2001). Although the CEO at the time, 
Peter Hill, noted the airline had US $500m insurance, the real damage was the defection of 
customers to rival airlines including Emirates (which owned 40% at the time) and rising insurance 
premiums (BBC, 2001). The civil war between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) that lasted from 1983 to 2009 had a detrimental effect on the domestic industries 
including aviation and tourism. The LTTE also targeted the airlines. Most notable attacks included 
the 1986 when LTTE exploded an Air Lanka aircraft at Katunayake International Airport killing 
21 and injuring over 40 people (BBC, 2017).  According to Flight International, around four years 
following Emirates stake in the airline, the new Sri Lankan government threatened to revise the 
deal due to perceived unfair protection for the flag carrier (Ionides, 2002). 
In 2010, Sri Lanka's government completed an agreement to buy-back Emirates' stake in 
Sri Lankan Airlines raising its stake to 94.7% and ending Emirates involvement lasting over a 
decade and ending the 10-year management contract signed in 1998 (Airline Business, 2010). This 
followed the return of “management control” to the government in 2008 following public 
disagreement between the two partners but also paved the way for the airline to pursue its 
preliminary ties with Etihad Airways (Airline Business, 2010). 
The hub connectivity potential of Sri Lanka is evident from the fact that a large proportion 




suggests that only one in 10 passengers flying with SLA from China sets foot in Sri Lanka, with 
the rest landing in either India or the Maldives (Nagahawatte & O’Connell, 2015). Moreover, Sri 
Lanka’s case as home to numerous exceptional tourist attractions was further enhanced when the 
“New York Times” ranked it as the number one travel destination for 2010 and then ranked by 
Lonely Planet as best destination for 2013. Such rankings and reviews provide a unique business 
case for SLA. However, SLA has so far failed to achieve its potential and remains an ailing Sri 
Lankan enterprise. This can be attributed to many structural issues as well as strategic and 
operational blunders which will be discussed below.  
 Since Sri Lanka is recovering from nearly three decades of civil war, its strategic 
geographical location, fast-growing regional markets, and unique tourist attractions should provide 
the airline with an opportunity to regain missed opportunities. However, the post-war SLA recorded 
consecutive operating losses. Therefore, key structural issues arising from the state ownership and 
political influences undermined the potential of SLA. This was evidenced at the time when the 
Emirates relinquished its ownership and management contract with SLA in 2008 and 2010 
respectively. It was rather surprising that Emirates wanted to abandon SLA at a time it was 
performing quite well. This was, allegedly, largely due to a dispute between the incumbent CEO 
(Peter Hill) of SLA and the incumbent President of Sri Lanka (Mahinda Rajapaksa) whereby the 
former refused to bump 35 passengers from a flight to make way for Sri Lanka’s president and his 
entourage (Ionides, 2008a, 2008b; The Advocata Institute, 2016). Soon after this dispute, Peter Hill 
had his work permit revoked and lost his job, and subsequently Emirates publicized that they were 
unsuccessful in extending the top management team contract with SLA.  
------------------------ 






4.2.1 Poor human resource management 
Another associated issue with state ownership is the resultant poor human resource 
management. The first issue is that the government often appointed politically connected 
individuals to the top management team irrespective of their suitability. For example, when SLA 
became a fully state-owned enterprise after the Emirates’ divestment, there were several high-
profile political appointments in SLA. For example, President Rajapaksa appointed his brother-in-
law to the chairman’s position, despite his inexperience in the airline industry. Second, the Sri 
Lankan government is notoriously famous for using the SOEs to provide job opportunities to boost 
employment (Nagahawatte & O’Connell, 2015) and to gain political capital by posturing and 
pandering to the electorate. There is anecdotal evidence to show that this was the case after the 
Emirates’ divestment. Also, we can clearly see a significant continuous increase in staffing after 
the airline became a fully state-owned enterprise (Table 1), despite the sharp decrease in revenue 
and increase in operational loss during the period. As a result, SLA has now become one of the 
least productive airlines: for example, by 2014 SLA had 289 employees per aircraft compared to 
134 for Singapore Airlines (Nagahawatte & O’Connell, 2015).  
Another drawback of the state ownership is the problem of agency, which can become quite 
perilous in a country with high corruption. After the divestment by Emirates, abuse of power 
became rampant at SLA and then there were many allegations of corruption. For example, in 2011 
when the firm was performing very poorly, SLA made a decision to re-fleet their aircraft by using 
around $2.3 billion to purchase 10 aircraft (encompassing six A330-300s and four A350-900s) from 
Airbus while there were several discounted alternatives (The Sunday Times, 2015). There were 
many allegations of financial payments made to individuals connected to the government, with 
some financial payments based on faked documents (The Sunday Times, 2015). After the 
divestiture by Emirates, operating expenditure of SLA increased dramatically; operating costs 




One of the key strategies undertaken by Sri Lanka’s national carrier is to engage in various 
forms of collaboration with foreign partners. Altogether, there have been five international 
partnerships between the national carrier (i.e., Air Ceylon or Air Lanka/SLA) and foreign airlines, 
namely ANA, British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC), KLM, Singapore Airlines, and 
Emirates. Foreign airlines, both as an investor and through various other forms of collaborations, 
have played a key role in the initial inception of the national carrier as well as its subsequent 
operations/growth. These collaborations and frequent changes in partnerships were imperative for 
the airline’s SR activities in terms of dealing with the changes in the environment/competition and 
for the survival/growth of SLA, particularly given its small size and since it is originating from a 
small developing country. Given the small size of the internal market (i.e., Sri Lankan passengers) 
and their lower affordability (85% rural population), SLA cannot rely on Sri Lankan customers. 
However, as a small airline and with both internal (within firm) and parent-related (Sri Lankan 
government) investment constraints, it would be difficult to allocate a sizable budget to develop its 
brand overseas. Therefore, such foreign collaborations contribute importantly to developing its 
brand overseas to attract foreign customers (Nagahawatte & O’Connell, 2015). Moreover, through 
these collaborations SLA was able to tap into the foreign multinational airlines’ superior 
management methods, advanced technology, efficient operations, and experience.  
4.2.2 Strategic alliances 
One of the most instrumental partnerships was the one with Emirates during 1998–2008. 
By cooperating with Emirates, Europe and the Middle East became the most profitable markets for 
SLA. Through the strategic partnership with Emirates, SLA benefited from Emirates’ vast 
international network and also gained a boost to its brand from the reputation of Emirates. 
Nonetheless, a decisive moment occurred in 2008 when Emirates declared that it would not extend 
the cooperation with the Sri Lankan government. Subsequently, Emirates sold their stake back to 




quality of service, the divestment by an experienced and professional partner such as Emirates 
meant that the overall human resource management systems were weakened. In addition, the 
interference of the Sri Lankan government in the recruitment process contributed to exacerbating 
the poor quality of services. For instance, a flight between Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in May 2014 
had to make an emergency landing after take-off owing to the errors in the navigation operation 
(Colman, 2016). Subsequent investigation discovered a lack of skilled and experienced ground staff 
in Colombo as a major source of the incident (Colman, 2016). 
With Emirates’ divestment, SLA not only lost its access to Emirates’ superior competitive 
advantages, but also had to compete with Emirates both internationally and domestically. For 
example, SLA struggled in the Middle East and Europe after the divestment and, consequently, 
were forced to limit their operations in serving European destinations (Nagahawatte & O’Connell, 
2015). SLA is now facing fierce competition from the Gulf carriers, Emirates in particular, and 
finding it difficult to compete with their scale, brand presence, in-flight product superiority, and 
access to financial markets and airport infrastructure (Nagahawatte & O’Connell, 2015). 
Furthermore, Emirates already obtained valuable knowledge about the Sri Lankan market through 
its previous involvement, therefore, SLA not only had to compete in Emirates’ comfort territories 
but also had to compete domestically. With the withdrawal of Emirates, SLA, as a fully state-owned 
enterprise, had no mechanism to prevent political influence, which was one of the main reasons for 
the escalation of operational costs. After the Emirates’ divestment, SLA has not collaborated much 
with foreign partners. 
 However, a notable development was SLA becoming a member of the Oneworld Alliance 
in May 2014, being the first carrier from the Indian subcontinent to join a global alliance (Sri 
Lankan Airlines, 2013). The Sri Lankan government has always tried to position SLA with a sense 
of patriotism and maintained the legacy outlook of the Airline (Nagahawatte & O’Connell, 2015). 




in the country, and many firms in Sri Lanka have used such positioning to attract local customers. 
In fact, available evidence shows that Sri Lankans feel a sense of patriotism and an emotional bond 
towards the national flag carrier (Nagahawatte & O’Connell, 2015). However, whether such a 
strategy is overall beneficial is questionable given that the Sri Lankan market is quite small. If the 
airline wants to capitalize on the country’s geographical location and tourism potential, then having 
a more outward-oriented approach would be needed. Furthermore, SLA competes only through 
price while all aspects of its product offering are inferior to its counterparts (Nagahawatte & 
O’Connell, 2015). Again, such a strategy would only be good enough to attract price-conscious 
customers, such as Sri Lankan passengers who are relatively less affluent.  
SLA’s post-divestment growth rate was lower, compared to its pre-divestment growth rate, 
despite the considerable increase in its post-divestment operating expenditure. Above all, SLA 
which was a profitable enterprise prior to the divestment, consecutively reported large losses since 
its divestment. After the change in the government in 2015, the new government now perceives a 
reconstruction plan for SLA, while actively seeking another foreign partner. SLA’s dismal 
performance after the divestment is plausible for several reasons. The competitive advantages of 
MNEs are derived from their superiority in technology and management (Grosse, 1992; Chisik, 
2002). The brand image of Emirates and the proximity to Sri Lanka also add to competitive 
advantage. Therefore, by cooperating with Emirates, the markets in Europe and the Middle East 
become more profitable for SLA.  
SLA struggled in the Middle East and Europe after the divestment and, consequently, had 
to cut down the number of flights to Europe due to huge operational costs (Samath, 2016). The 
knowledge of the Sri Lankan market also equipped Emirates to compete in the domestic Sri Lankan 
market. Financial resources of state-owned firms usually come from the state, such as national 
banks or the treasury, and it is quite essential to have the right mechanisms to assure the effective 




close-knit relationships between self-interest state authorities, the board, and management. A non-
state ownership, particularly a reputed foreign partner, could limit such political influence, agency 
problems, and conflict of interests. 
4.2.3 Business renewal for the future   
Besides these relative successes in developing footprint in international markets, SriLankan 
Airlines is largely seen as a “loss making flag carrier” (Bailey, 2019, p. nd). In 2015, the then new 
government of Sri Lanka accused the loss-making airline of fermenting a “culture of corruption" 
encompassing the irregularities in a $2.3bn acquisition of 10 aircrafts and launched a criminal 
investigation into its activities (BBC, 2015). In September 2018, the airline was reported to be in 
debt of at least $1bn (BBC, 2018). Sri Lanka’s loss-making flag carrier has unveiled a five-year 
plan aimed at turning their fortunes around focusing on expansion and improving the customer 
experience. In 2019, the airline revealed a five-year (2019-2024) business renewal strategy aimed 
at reversing the decline and putting it on the path to become the Next “Emirates” - to emulate the 
successes accumulated by Emirates around the globe (Bailey, 2019). A cornerstone of Sri Lankan 
Airlines’ strategy was on developing and leveraging a more efficient hub-and-spoke model 
including development of the Colombo hub (Bailey, 2019). The hub-and-spoke model is largely 
seen as more effective in linking multiple destinations on both long-haul routes and short-haul 
routes relative to the point-to-point networks utilized by regional and low-cost airlines (Amankwah-
Amoah & Debrah, 2009). The reform seeks to help the airline fulfil its potential contribution to the 
national economy (Bailey, 2019, p. nd). 
5  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The aim of this article was to examine how organizations renew themselves during crises. 
Drawing key insights from the two underperforming airlines—Pakistan International Airlines and 




COVID-19 pandemic. It is evident that SOEs are bedeviled with resource constraints exacerbated 
by unwarranted state interference and poor use of intangible knowledge sources arising through the 
rapid rise of digitalization and big-data-associated knowledge assets. Such trends affect the strategy 
formulation and implementation leaving such national carriers struggling for survival and unable 
to respond to external shocks and black swan events effectively. The cases reveal that the various 
SR initiatives taken by the airlines were largely reactive rather than proactive. The case firms were 
unable to develop strategies, learning capabilities, and related actions aimed at anticipating future 
environmental changes and reorganizing to respond to the emerging dynamic environments 
characterized by industry 4.0 technologies. Both PIA and SLA are reactive organizations and focus 
more on responding to past or ongoing environmental upheavals rather than utilizing industry 4.0 
technologies and appropriately restructuring operations to respond to the black swan events such 
as those caused by the current pandemic. Previous studies on SR have sought to explicate the 
relationships between renewal and performance without accounting for inherent strategic processes. 
Accordingly, limited insights have been offered on this issue, particularly in the context of 
emerging and developing economies (Ndofor et al., 2013). This study seeks to fill this void by 
examining how renewals manifested in two South Asian state-owned airlines: PIA and SLA. A 
promising aspect of the present study is that it provides new insights into how government 
involvement could inhibit organizational renewal. In this article, we sought to shed light on why 
underperforming SOEs experience little reform and how they can be revitalized in a highly 
competitive and dynamic business environment of the 21st century. We explore this issue using the 
cases of PIA and SLA. It can be deduced that such underperforming airlines maintain their existence 
largely due to strong influence and support from the nation state.  
In retrospect, therefore, PIA’s problems could be the result of historical state influences in 
the management and control of the airline. Another possible explanation for the airline’s problems 
is that the pace of competition and liberalization in the global industry has not matched the pace of 




that SOAs have been bedeviled by poor performance because of lapses in management with an 
attendant lack of requisite managerial and technical staff. These have been compounded by 
misallocation of limited resources and excessive interference by state governments. Our study 
points to the fact that forming strategic alliances with internationally recognized airlines who have 
established networks and highly recognizable brands can reduce the interference of the state. In 
recent years, Sri Lankan Airlines has managed to accumulate some accolades including becoming 
a member of Oneworld Alliance and the largest international airline offering service to southern 
India and the Maldives (Begum, 2020), as well as operating to over 100 destinations in 48 nations 
(Oneworld, 2020). 
Our study shows that full state ownership only leads to losses but where recognized foreign 
firms are involved, as partners, the state airlines could perform better. These findings also 
emphasize that SOEs are ill-equipped to respond to changes in the business environment because 
they have not developed the necessary capabilities to reconfigure their resources and capabilities 
continuously to address environmental threats since renewal of a capability is at the cornerstone of 
DCs (Teece et al., 1997). Since firms require DCs to foster firm renewal (Riviere et al., 2018), 
SOEs are more likely to respond to the impact of external environmental factors by learning from 
the past and continuously restructuring their operations. SOEs also need to invest in developing 
their learning capabilities in order to respond to external shocks effectively. Consequently, 
underperforming national carriers may face bigger problems to renew and revive their operations 
in response to the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic.  
5.1 Practical implications 
The practical implications of the study are fourfold. To revive such ailing state-owned or 
underperforming organizations to market improved competitiveness, we advocate the following 
steps which entail identifying the root causes and learning, breaking the resistance and revitalizing 




Phase 1: Identifying the root causes and learning from others. By weeding out 
underutilized and underperforming employees, SOAs would be able to establish a strong base to be 
able to compete and offer more attractive packages to customers. In order to move from 
underperformance into high performance, the organization needs to learn from those whose current 
predicament reflected their own experiences. For instance, Kenya Airways had similar problems, 
but it has been able to transform itself through reforms and privatization (Debrah & Toroitich, 
2005).  
The global airline industry is littered with examples of SOAs such as Nigeria Airways, Air Afrique, 
and Ghana Airways, which resisted pressure to privatize to improve economic performance only to 
eventually succumb to debilitating problems such as overstaffing and protection from free market 
competition by governments, which eventually led to their demise (Amankwah-Amoah & Debrah, 
2014). Often protection by governments can create conditions for mismanagement, mediocrity, and 
tolerance of poor attitude to work. Such tendencies also inhibit developing DCs. Only a handful of 
government-owned airlines around the globe managed by civil servants or dictated to by 
governments have survived and/or flourished. Therefore, minimizing or reducing government 
interference in such organizations could free managers to pursue cost efficiencies as well as develop 
much needed DCs to respond to changes in the business environment. 
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
----------------------- 
Phase 2: Breaking the resistance. The second step is to begin the move towards 
revitalizing the organization. As more businesses collapse in the wake of resistance to change or 
privatization, many of those resistant to change eventually become the main victims. By educating 
workers of the potential effects of an unreformed company, firms would be able to unfreeze some 
of the resistance to privatization or internal reforms. This also means adopting new routines, 




chosen approaches. This also means developing and embedding a new culture which places greater 
emphasis on efficiency and performance improvement. This step could mean providing more 
opportunities for professional management and expertise to be infused into the organization.  
Phase 3: Retooling and drawing the battlegrounds. Besides drawing the national, 
regional, and global battle lines, airlines then need a strategy towards capturing value related to 
doing business along the key routes. This means seeking full capacity and reducing delays. This is 
where it is pertinent to highlight that strategic alliances and networks could give access to important 
routes that these national airlines should actively pursue and learn from their alliance partners.  
Phase 4: Lock in the progress. Often many organizations develop a turnaround strategy 
which delivers temporary performance improvement and successes, only to see performance 
regress within a short period chiefly because of a lack of effective measures to embed the changes. 
In our cases the return back to full state control meant the return to poor performance. For airlines, 
there is a need to lock in progress rather than revert to a previous, seemingly comfortable, position 
which involved undoing hitherto embedded changes. This is at the point where organizations need 
to conclude that there is no going back to previous defective routines, overstaffing, and 
mismanagement. Our evidence confirms that such an approach would, ultimately, lead to a return 
to failure and exit. The managers and policy makers could also learn from firms operating in 
different industries and learn their renewal processes—the case in point is IBM (cf. Agarwal & 
Helfat, 2009).  
5.2 Potential limitations 
Although our study has given us first-hand strategic approaches to the revitalization of 
SOEs, our reliance on secondary archival sources to uncover how the strategic renewal efforts 
unfolded has limitations. While the activities span several decades, this approach lacks rich in-depth 




research could incorporate primary data to improve our understanding of the observed phenomena. 
The current study also focused on renewals, which did not account fully for the effects of national 
government policies and future studies could incorporate the effects of policymaking. Future 
studies should also explore what other factors influence SOEs’ adaptation to external crises. In 
particular, a close comparison between surviving state-owned firms and the ones that collapse may 
shed more light on the reasons for collapse and failure whilst at the same time giving insight into 
the possible strategic approaches to revitalizing such firms. SOEs’ response to external shocks and 
black swan events remains a relatively underexplored topic, thus future studies could shed more 
light on how these firms use firm level actions, develop ambidextrous learning capabilities, and 
adapt their business models in order to respond to external challenges. There is also scope to 
examine a diverse range of firms, including family firms as well as new start-ups, and examine how 
such firms from different industries undertake SR and respond to external challenges. Such studies 
could integrate insights from the micro-foundations and strategy as practice literature and 
understand the strategic renewal processes of different types of firms. Finally, longitudinally 
studying the strategic renewal processes at the firm, industry, and value chain levels might offer 
important insights on this important topic.  
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Table 1. Key events illustrating salient events in Sri Lankan Airlines 
Period  Key events  
1940s ● 1947 – Air Ceylon was established in 1947 as the state-owned flag carrier in Sri Lanka. 
● 1948 – An agreement was signed with Australian National Airways to provide Air 
Ceylon with technical assistance to operate the aircraft.  
● 1949 – ANA acquired a 49% stake in Air Ceylon. 
1950s ● 1951 – Air Ceylon became a Corporation, with the Government of Ceylon owning 
51% and ANA owning the remaining 49%. 
● 1953 – Air Ceylon stopped international flights due to the competition from British 
Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) and Trans World Airlines. Air Ceylon 
discontinued all long-haul flights and gave up its partnership with ANA. 
● 1955 – Dutch carrier KLM acquired the 49% stake held by ANA. 
● 1956 – Air Ceylon resumed international flights. 
1960s ● 1961 – Air Ceylon stopped international flights again due to the competition.  
● 1962 – Air Ceylon left the partnership with KLM and went into a partnership with 
BOAC for support on its overseas operations. To conduct Air Ceylon flights to 
London, BOAC operated its own aircraft under Air Ceylon stickers. 
● During this period, Air Ceylon left the partnership with KLM and went into a 
partnership with BOAC for support on its overseas operations. BOAC conducted Air 
Ceylon flights to London. BOAC operated its own aircraft under Air Ceylon stickers. 
● 1968 – The new Bandaranaike International Airport at Katunayake was commissioned. 
● 1969 – Air Ceylon started international flights again. 
● 1971 – After the termination of the Air Ceylon/BOAC liaison, Air Ceylon negotiated 
a deal with the French company UTA Airlines to provide commercial and technical 
assistance. 
1970s ● 1977 – Air Ceylon got into trouble with alleged mismanagement, corruption, and 
financial instability. International services were suspended.  
● 1978 – Explosion of Air Ceylon HS-748 aircraft by LTTE terrorists at Ratmalana 
Airport. 
● 1979 – The government terminated the operations of Air Ceylon and replaced it with 
Air Lanka. 
● During this period, Singapore Airlines provided initial assistance in training and 
development and lent aircraft which were later bought by Air Lanka. 
1980s ● 1986 – Explosion of Air Lanka aircraft at Katunayake International Airport by the 
LTTE terrorists killing 21 and injuring over 40 people. 
1990s ● In 1998, Air Lanka was partially privatized and Emirates acquired 43.63% of the 
ownership of Air Lanka. AirLanka was rebranded as SLA. The Sri Lankan government 
and Emirates also signed a strategic partnership which offered Emirates a management 
contract for 10 years. 
2000s ● 2001 – LTTE infiltrated the Katunayake Air Force base and destroyed eight military 
aircraft on the Air Force side and two Airbus A340, one Airbus A330 aircraft and one 
Airbus 320-200 aircraft. The three Airbuses destroyed constituted three of SLA’s 12 
aircraft. The two other damaged aircraft meant that nearly half of the airline’s fleet was 
out of commission.  
● 2008 – Emirates announced that they would not extend the partnership with the Sri 
Lankan government.  
● 2010 – Subsequently Emirates sold their ownership stake back to the Sri Lankan 
government in 2010 and SLA returned to a fully state-owned organization. 
2010s ● Became a member of the Oneworld Alliance in May 2014. 
Source: synthesized by the authors from various sources including Sri Lanka Civil Aviation 
Authority, 2017; Oneworld, 2020; and Thiedeman, 1997. 
